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ARGUMENTS 
I. IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THIS COURT'S DECISION 
IN SPRINGVILLE CITIZENS AND THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-1001(3), THE COURT OF 
APPEALS HELD THAT THE REASONABLY DEBATABLE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW IS TO BE APPLIED TO A 
MUNICIPALITY'S LAND USE DECISION. 
Payson City Corporation argues that this Court has "long 
recognized" the distinction between the standard for judicial 
review of "legislative decisions as opposed to administrative 
actions of local government." See Brief of Respondent, pp. 12-16. 
However, Payson City Corporation ignores the fact that essentially 
all of the cases cited by it in support of this proposition were 
decided prior to the enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) in 
1991. Payson City Corporation also ignores the fact that this 
Court's decision in Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. 
City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P. 2d 332, superseded any 
prior law recognizing a difference in the standard of review for 
administrative versus legislative actions. Consequently, the case 
law cited by Payson City Corporation is of no significance to this 
appeal. 
Payson City Corporation also argues that Mt]here is no case 
law which would support the application of a substantial evidence 
standard to judicial review of a legislative decision by the 
governing body of a municipality." See Brief of Respondent, p. 
5 
15. This argument likewise ignores this Court's decision in 
Springville Citizens, where the Court took the plain language of 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 at face value, questioning not whether 
the Utah Legislature somehow intended that two different standards 
of judicial review are to be derived from the single and simple 
standard set forth in the statute. Id. at ^f22-25. In the course 
of its decision, this Court refused to distinguish between 
administrative and legislative functions and, without reservation, 
unanimously accepted the Legislature's plain language as set forth 
in § 10-9-1001(3). Id. at ff22-23. In accordance with that plain 
language, this Court held that u [a] municipality's land use 
decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported by 
substantial evidence." See id. at 1f24 (citing Patterson v. Utah 
County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). 
This Court's decision in Springville Citizens, which 
construes Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3), is supported by the 
explicit and mandatory command of the statute's plain language. 
By enacting Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3), the Utah Legislature 
explicitly adopted a uniform standard to review a municipality's 
land use decision, the application of which is mandatory in 
nature. The language utilized by the Legislature states, "The 
courts shall: . . . determine only whether or not the decision is 
6 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
1001(3) (b) (1999) (emphasis added) . 
A. This Court's Decision in Springville Citizens 
Conforms With Weil-Established Rules of 
Statutory Construction. 
Payson City Corporation's position that this Court's 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) in Springville 
Citizens violates basic rules of statutory construction is 
fundamentally flawed. This Court's reading in Springville 
Citizens of the standard of review set forth in § 10-9-1001(3) is 
not only consistent with, but mandated by, well-established rules 
of statutory construction. 
When examining a statute, the appellate court looks "first to 
its plain language as the best indicator of the legislature's 
intent and purpose in passing the statute." Wilson v. Valley 
Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1998). "Only if the 
language is ambiguous do[es] [the appellate court] then turn to a 
consideration of legislative history and relevant policy 
considerations." Id. (citing World Peace Movement v. Newspaper 
Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994)) . "A cardinal rule of 
statutory construction is that courts are not to infer substantive 
terms into the text that are not already there." Berrett v. 
Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994). "Rather, the 
interpretation must be based on the language used, and the court 
7 
has no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not 
expressed." Id. (citing Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184, 185 (1945) (citation 
omitted)); see also Hanchett v. Burbidge, 59 Utah 127, 135, 202 P. 
377, 379-80 (1921) ("When language is clear and unambiguous, it 
must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for 
construction."). 
In Springville Citizens, this Court took the unambiguous 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 at face value, as it is 
required to do, questioning not whether the Utah Legislature 
intended that two different standards of judicial review are to be 
derived from the single and simple standard set forth in the 
statute. Id. at ^[22-25. By so doing, this Court refused to 
infer substantive terms that distinguish between administrative 
and legislative functions and unanimously accepted the 
Legislature's plain language as set forth in § 10-9-1001(3). Id. 
at f 1f22-23. Consistent with the statute's plain language, this 
Court held that w [a] municipality's land use decision is arbitrary 
and capricious if it is not supported by substantial evidence." 
See id. at 1(24 (citing Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 
893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). Consequently, this Court 
in Springville Citizens held the clear and unambiguous language of 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) to mean what it expresses, leaving 
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no room for further construction such as that asserted by Payson 
City Corporation. 
B. The Substantial Evidence Standard of Review 
Set Forth in Springville Citizens and Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) Does Not Apply to 
Purely Legislative Functions. 
Contrary to the mistaken assertions of Payson City 
Corporation, the substantial evidence standard set forth in 
Springville Citizens, which emanates from the plain language of 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1003(3), does not apply to purely 
legislative functions exercised by the legislative body of a 
municipality. Such legislative enactments or policy-making 
actions are, typically, highly visible and affect a large portion 
of the public. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law, § 6.26 (4th 
ed. 1997) (citing Cooper v. Board of County Comm'rs, 614 P.2d 947 
(Idaho 1980) and American Law Institute, Model Land Development 
Code § 2-312); see also Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 62 7 
So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. 1993) . Consequently, great deference is 
given to purely legislative functions on the theory that the 
appropriate remedy is to be had at the polls. See Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388, 47 S.Ct. 114, 118 
(1926); Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Engh Floral 
Co., 545 P.2d 1150, 1151-52 (Utah 1976). 
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Conversely, land use decisions by a local zoning body that 
affect a limited number of persons or property owners that can be 
functionally viewed as policy application, rather than policy 
setting, are quasi-judicial or quasi legislative in nature. See 
Mandelker, at § 6.26 (citing Cooper v. Board of County Comm'rs, 
614 P.2d 947 (Idaho 1980) and American Law Institute, Model Land 
Development Code § 2-312); see also Snyder, 627 So.2d at 474. 
These land use decisions are subject to the substantial evidence 
standard set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3), as construed 
by this Court in Springville Citizens, because, theoretically, 
most voters are unaware or unconcerned that fair dealing and 
consistent treatment may have been compromised by action deemed 
legislative by the local zoning body. See Mandelker, at § 6.26 
(citing Cooper v. Board of County Comm'rs, 614 P.2d 947 (Idaho 
1980)); see also Snyder, 627 So.2d at 474. 
The aforementioned distinction between a purely legislative 
or policy-setting function and quasi-judicial land use decision 
that results in an application of policy is set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9-3 03 of the Municipal Land Use Development and 
Management Act, which is codified at Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-101, et 
seg. According to subsection 3 03 (a), "The general plan is an 
advisory guide for land use decisions." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
303(a) (1999) (emphasis added). 
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The substantial evidence standard set forth in Springville 
Citizens is not only supported by the plain language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9-1001(3), it is grounded in logical reasoning and 
principles of sound public policy. The requirement that land use 
decisions be supported by substantial evidence protects the right 
of a property owner to use his or her property and, at the same 
time, promotes the public interest in rational and orderly land-
use planning. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-102 (1999) (stating that 
the purpose of the chapter is to, among other things, "promote . 
. . [the] good order . . . of the municipality and its present and 
future inhabitants[, ] . . . protect both urban and nonurban 
development . . .[,] and to protect property values . . . . " ) . 
Contrary to Payson City Corporation's assertions, the 
substantial evidence standard is not so onerous a burden for a 
governmental entity. According to Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of 
Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), which this Court 
cited in support of its holding in Springville Citizens, 
"
x
 [s]ubstantial evidence' is that quantum and quality of evidence 
that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a 
conclusion." Id. at 604 n.6 (citation omitted). In other words, 
substantial evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of evidence 
. . . though 'something less than the weight of the evidence.'" 
Id. (citing Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P. 2d 63, 68 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 
110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985)). Further, the 
substantial evidence standard of review, by its very nature, 
presumes that land use decisions and regulations are valid, which 
comports with the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
1001(3)(a). 
II. BY RELYING ON ITS OWN ERRONEOUS DISTINCTION MADE 
IN HARMON CITY, THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED 
WELL-ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OP STARE DECISIS AND 
REFUSED TO FOLLOW THE STATUTORY COMMAND OF THE 
LEGISLATURE. 
Payson City Corporation argues that the court of appeals 
correctly concluded that this Court did not "intend" to hold as it 
did in Springville Citizens. See Brief of Respondent, pp. 20-23. 
This position flies in the face of the plain and unambiguous 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1003(3) and the legal principles 
underlying stare decisis. 
This Court, in Springville Citizens, decided the same issue 
as that in the instant case. As a result, Springville Citizens 
is controlling. Contrary to the court of appeals' erroneous 
conclusion of being bound by an earlier panel's decision,1 the 
court of appeals was not empowered to adopt a ruling to the 
*In Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2001 UT App 9, 17 P. 3d 1160, 
the majority concluded that it was "bound by the earlier panel's 
decision" in Harmon City v. Draper City, 2000 UT App 31, 997 P.2d 
321, by virtue of horizontal stare decisis. Jd. at fl7. 
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contrary because it must strictly follow the decisions rendered by 
this Court. See Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2001 UT App 9, f42, 
17 P.3d 1160 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Menzies, 
889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (stating that the court of 
appeals must "follow strictly the decisions rendered" by the 
supreme court (emphasis added); and Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 
892, 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the court of appeals 
"is bound to follow controlling decisions of the Utah Supreme 
Court")) . 
Not only did the court of appeals7 reliance on its own 
erroneous distinction made in Harmon City violate established 
principles of stare decisis, but, by so holding, the court of 
appeals refused to follow the Legislature's explicit statutory 
command in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3). The Utah Legislature 
enacted that statute, the plain language of which sets forth a 
uniform standard of review for municipal land use decisions. This 
Court, in turn, construed the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 
10-9-1001(3) in Springville Citizens, stating clearly that u [a] 
municipality's land use decision is arbitrary and capricious if it 
is not supported by substantial evidence." See Springville 
Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 
25, H 24, 979 P. 2d 332 (citing Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of 
Adjustment, 893 P. 2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). By so 
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holding, this Court did not attempt to repeal the Legislature's 
standard of review mandate as the majority of the court of appeals 
in this case did. See Bradley, 2001 UT App 9 at f43 (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
Notwithstanding the arguments of Payson City Corporation 
concerning this Court's decision in Springville Citizens, this 
Court actually applied the substantial evidence standard of review 
in the course of its analysis. See id. at f24 (stating 
municipality's '"decision was not arbitrary or capricious but . . 
. was supported by substantial evidence"); see also Bradley, 2001 
UT App 9 at f43 (Jackson, J., dissenting); and Harmon City, 2000 
UT App 31 at f45 (Jackson, J. , dissenting) . Consequently, the 
Court's analysis is internally consistent with its interpretation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3). 
III. EVEN UNDER THE "REASONABLY DEBATABLE" STANDARD OF 
REVIEW, THE RECORD REVEALS THAT THE CITY COUNCIL'S 
DENIAL OF PETITIONERS' R-2-75 REZONE APPLICATION 
WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
Payson City Corporation argues that its denial of "Bradley's 
rezoning request was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal." See 
Brief of Respondent, pp. 23-29. The argument of Payson City 
Corporation falls substantially short of establishing that its 
denial of Petitioners' R-2-75 rezone application was even 
reasonably or fairly debatable. Petitioners will not duplicate 
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here their argument set forth in the Brief of Petitioners, which 
details how the court of appeals ignored various significant 
inconsistencies and critical record evidence in the course of its 
erroneous analysis under the reasonably debatable standard of 
review. See Brief of Petitioners, (Argument II), pp. 21-28. 
However, one particular matter warrants discussion to correct a 
significant inaccuracy in Payson City Corporation's Brief of 
Respondent. 
Payson City Corporation contends that the court of appeals 
reviewed and found supporting evidence in the record that is not 
discussed by Petitioners in their Brief. See Brief of Respondent, 
p. 28. This evidence, however, which is a letter from the Manager 
of American Stores Properties Mill, dated May 7, 1996, was not 
properly before the court of appeals inasmuch as it was presented 
in the course of Petitioners' second rezone application from R-l-A 
to R-l-9000, not the first rezone application from R-l-A to R-2-75 
involved in the instant appeal (See R. 108).2 The fact that the 
letter was not before the court of appeals and should not have 
been considered is demonstrated by the Interoffice Memo of the 
Payson City Planning Commission to the City Council, to which the 
letter is attached (See R. 110-11). That Memo was created by the 
2The court of appeals mistakenly refers to Associated Foods as 
the author of the letter. See Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2001 UT 
App 9, 1fl9 n.7, 17 P.3d 1160. 
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Planning Commission solely for the purpose of advising the City 
Council about the rezone application from R-l-A to R-l-9000 (See 
id.) . 
The court of appeals justified its consideration of the 
letter dated May 7, 1996, by reasoning that the letter was 
attached to the "Findings of the City Council Decision" prepared 
by the City, and that the trial court considered the findings to 
make its decision. Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2001 UT App 9, 
1Jl9 n.3, 17 P. 3d 1160. This reasoning by the court of appeals is 
fundamentally flawed inasmuch as it violates Petitioners' right to 
due process because the letter had not even been drafted, let 
alone presented, at the time of the hearing on the first rezone 
application, which is the land use decision in dispute here.3 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the 
previously filed Brief of Petitioners, Petitioners respectfully 
request that this Court reverse the court of appeals Opinion and 
3In its Cross-Petition, Payson City Corporation argues that the 
court of appeals erred when by concluding that it had original 
appellate jurisdiction over the instant appeal. See Brief of Cross-
Petitioner, pp. 29-32. Although the court of appeals' may have erred 
by basing its determination on Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (b) (i) , any 
error was harmless. See Slusher v. Ospital, 111 P. 2d 437 (Utah 
1989). In addition, the issue is moot and judicial policy dictates 
against advisory opinions, which is what Payson City Corporation is 
requesting. See Black v. Alpha Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d 409, 410-11 
(Utah 1982) . 
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remand the case for the entry of orders or proceedings consistent 
with this Court's instructions as set forth in its decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of June, 2002. 
"^WIGGINS, P.C, 
Scott—fa" Wickjins 
Attorney-s^MLc^Peti t ioners 
and Cross-Respondents 
17 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing COMBINED BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS to the following on this 2 6th day of June, 
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Mr. Jody K Burnett 
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ADDENDA 
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(11) and inasmuch as the documents referred to 
herein are set forth in the Addendum attached to the previously 
filed Brief of Petitioners. 
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